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Abstract
Dynamic malware detection is performed by monitoring system parameters at runtime (i.e., be-
havior of applications is monitored as they run on the system). To collect data necessary for the
development of such detection methods, applications need to be run in a controlled environment
and malware need to be properly triggered. Some methods are totally random (i.e., the exer-
ciser creates a predefined number of events), while some others are based on GUI models (i.e.,
generated events are generated by using a library of different user interfaces).
Goal of this project is to compare different methods for exercising applications, with the pur-
pose of verifying that there is a significant difference between the methods. The project was
performed by using already available malware samples and the comparison was performed by
considering results obtained at USI.
Results were obtained sufficient to say that there is a difference in some of the features ex-
tracted while in others is less significant.
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1 Introduction
Android devices cover more than 50% of the market share making the Google OS the top target for
malware developers. A recent Techcrunch article [5] revealed that over 200 apps with more than
150 million downloads were malware. Google’s official figures indicated that more than 700,000
apps were removed from the play store last year. As this issue has increasingly frequented the
news, it is sufficient to say that malware detection is an important concern in the network security
world.
The two main categories of malware detection methods are static detection and dynamic de-
tection. Static methods consist of analyzing the application without executing it and relying only
on information that can be extracted from the apk file, such as the android manifest, API calls
or disassembled low-level code. It is not only a safe way to analyze an application but it is also
efficient, it has small overhead and the prediction methods it relies on are simple [6]. However,
dynamic methods consist of running the application and observing its behaviour and thus, col-
lecting more critical information, making it the preferred method. Dynamic malware detection
also involves malware triggering. Infected applications run normally until the user inputs a series
of events in the device (stimuli) and triggers the malicious piece of code [6]. In order not to infect
the host system, dynamic analysis methods run the app in a safe environment. An app is labelled
as malware by studying system parameters such as CPU or memory usage and feeding them to an
existing classification algorithm. Although it may seem irresponsible to execute malware in a ma-
chine, the run-time data collected from it is what helps to determine the nature of an application.
While there are a range of different dynamic methods available, two will be discussed within this
study: MonkeyRunner and UI-guided.
MonkeyRunner utility provided by Google was originally intended for developers to stress test
their app by sending random events. It is the most conventional tool to trigger malware as it is
easy to use and requires no instrumentation. This acts as an advantage given that modern mal-
ware can detect if instrumentation is being used and prevents itself from triggering. Even though
it is not proved, the random based input of events by MonkeyRunner and the unreasonable time
it may take to trigger the malware could lead to the belief that it is an inferior tool against the
UI-guided lightweight tool DroidBot. This tool also does not require instrumentation, as it gener-
ates a model of the app under testing and produces its next input, getting aid from information
obtained during run-time. The reason why DroidBot is more lightweight is because it does not
rely on any static analysis while it models the explored states. [7]
Proceeding from previous results obtained using MonkeyRunner [4], this thesis is a prelim-
inary study to determine whether using a more sophisticated tool like DroidBot will produce
notably different results.
In summary, a dataset of 8 apps was tested against both methods previously described. Data
was collected during runtime and processed afterwards revealing that in fact in some features
there is a difference but in others this difference is not as substantial.
This report is divided into three sections:
• Background: An explanation of the previous experiment and the environment that the new
one inherits as well as a brief description of the dataset.
• Approach: The explanation of the scripts used for the execution of the new experiment and
the difficulties that were encountered.
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• Results: Evaluation of the results obtained and reaching the goal of the thesis - a comparison
between the two experiments.
2 Background
This experiment is a continuation to the previous one regarded in the paper "Extinguishing Ran-
somware - A Hybrid Approach to Android Ransomware Detection" [4] written by advisor Alberto
Ferrante. This paper addresses the use of a hybrid system with a static and a dynamic phase as
a solution for malware detection. The static method essentially consists of using structural code
analysis: Every application is pre-processed to obtain the opcode 2-grams sequences (grouping
of 2 operational codes). Afterwards, the binary classifier gets trained with a labeled dataset and
finally the classifier is used for determining whether or not the apps are malware. With this
method, a precision ranging from 0.968 to 0.998 was obtained [4].
Similarly to the static method, the dynamic method also has two phases of pre-processing and
learning. In this case however, the classifier was trained with execution records of apps with
malicious behaviour, and then the results of the classification were used as the input for a sliding-
window algorithm that classifies the applications considering past history of execution. Using
different metrics, detection rate results ranged from 80.27% to 96.33% [4]. Combining both
methods, the apps that were undetected by the static algorithm underwent dynamic analysis too.
This hybrid method described in the paper obtained a 100% detection [4].
As the previous experiment used MonkeyRunner for the application exerciser, this is therefore
an introductory experiment to check if using DroidBot for malware detection makes a consider-
able difference against MonkeyRunner.
Given the nature of this comparison, this project has inherited some constraints: every tool, re-
source or environment that was used for the previous experiment has to be used for this one as
well, naturally with the exception of DroidBot.
In the following subsections the tool DroidBot, the environment in which the experiment took
place and the dataset which was used will be discussed.
2.1 DroidBot
Developed in the Peking University, this tool fetches information for monitoring purposes as well
as sending input events to the application; both tasks made via adb. These are lightweight pro-
cesses because they rely on already built-in android utilities. The information that DroidBot
fetches consist mainly on UI information, process information extracted from the ps command
and the log the app outputs. Whereas for sending events, DroidBot replicates different kinds of
stimuli such as UI inputs, intents or sensor data. As aforementioned, the tool produces a model
of the app during run-time. This model essentially is a directed graph where states of the app are
nodes and inputs that changed the state are arcs. The dynamic construction of this graph relies
on a preexisting state comparison algorithm which considers two nodes as being not equal if their
UI information is different [7]. The latest release of the tool was in 2017 but given the old version
of the dataset and the AVDs, the previous release 1.0.0a2[1] was used for this project.
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2.2 alarisrv10 Linux Server
The server on which the previous experiment was executed is a x86_64 Linux machine. The
Android Software Development Kit available is the release 20140702(Android 4) and the emu-
lator provided is the one inside this SDK. The reason for which such an old version is required
is because the malware sample consists of apps with an Android 4 target [4]. However, due to
incompatibility issues encountered during the experiment, DroidBot required a newer version of
the SDK and thus, the emulator as well. Since the data extracted is inherent to the emulator, the
decision of choosing a newer version of the emulator meant that the previous raw information
files were different from the newer ones. This caused a significant setback because all the results
from the MonkeyRunner experiment became unusable, meaning that the apps had to be tested
again with the MonkeyRunner tool as well.
Another recurring tool included in the SDK that allows communication between the host and
the emulator called adb was used to extract the needed data regarding CPU, memory and system
calls. For the network data, all network traffic was dumped from the emulator which was then
processed with the tool tcpstat.
All these tools define the environment in which this experiment took place.
2.3 Dataset
The specific type of malware that is going to be experimented on is called ransomware. Its main
goal is to block the device or encrypt its data for a later proposition of a ransom to the user to
get their data back. As an example, a few years back the FBI MoneyPak Ransomware[2] infected
many devices. Posing as the FBI the app prompted messages containing serious allegations and
accusations of breaking the law and then stated that a fine had to be paid. The original dataset of
the previous experiment included 672 ransomware apps obtained from the HelDroid[3] dataset
belonging to the time period between December 2014 and June 2015. For the purpose of this
experiment a smaller subset of 8 apps from the sample was chosen.
3 Approach
To achieve success with this experiment, a sample of tested apps is needed in order to get the
system features results. Therefore, a large part of the workload was to make the tool DroidBot
work and run the execution scripts after adjusting them to be compatible with the new tool. As
mentioned before, due to the change in the emulator version the already obtained results in the
hybrid method experiment were useless. This meant that system features results had to be ex-
tracted using the two tools MonkeyRunner and DroidBot.
The main subject of this section is detailing how the scripts for execution and data extraction
work and how the tool DroidBot was made to function properly in the environment provided.
3.1 behave_lugano.sh
While the tool DroidBot has to be executed over an app, the system data has to also be extracted
during its run-time; the bash script behave_lugano.sh is the responsible for this task. Originally
co-written by thesis advisor Alberto Ferrante this script was modified to make it work with the
tool DroidBot. Therefore, the way the original version works and what other scripts are needed
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to be executed needs to be explained first:
The main script is behave_lugano.sh, however the one that initiates the whole process of testing
the apps is called script.sh. The purpose of this script is to simultaneously run 4 instances of
the emulator, each of which are tested by a behave_lugano.sh process. In order to launch an
emulator instance, the script startemu.sh is executed; it starts an android emulator process in-
dicating the avd, the port for the adb connection and the path for the network dump file. Once
the emulator is set, script.sh invokes a process of behave_lugano.sh passing by argument the
name of the app and the emulator instance id. x What the main script does is:
• Waits for the device to be ready and installs the apk in it via adb.
• Extracts the package name which will be necessary for future tasks.
• Initiates the process of MonkeyRunner in the device indicating the package name of the app
to be tested and the total count of stimuli (In this case 20,000)
• Every two seconds until MonkeyRunner finishes the script does the following:
– Saves the time stamp of the current time.
– Extracts data to .txt files about CPU Usage and memory executing in the adb shell
the command dumpsys.
– Extracts data to .txt files about the execution trace executing in the adb shell the
command strace.
– Checks if the process id of the app changed and updates the local variable storing the
pid if necessary. This is necessary because the strace command needs the pid as an
argument.
• Terminates the emulator
After the behave_lugano process finishes, the script.sh process rewrites the avd files so emu-
lators are always launched from fresh copies. Then it initiates the cycle again with the next apk
to be tested.
In order to make the script behave_lugano.sh work with DroidBot some changes had to be
made. The first observation was that DroidBot installs the application before it starts sending
the events, therefore the step of installing the app via adb needed to be removed. This provoked
another issue in which the pid of the app in the device was unknown until DroidBot finished to
install and launch the application, resulting in empty records at the beginning of each raw data
text file. Further investigations should be made to determine if this change influences the results.
The stop condition had to change as well to 15 minutes spent executing for the reason that Droid-
Bot is not able to input 20,000 stimuli in an acceptable amount of time because between events,
the tool runs an algorithm to determine which is the best input to send next.
One other last small addition to the script was made; in some cases, during the execution of
DroidBot a message saying "This device might have been hijacked" was prompted. In these cases
a file called "hijacked.txt" was created as an indicator that said the message was prompted.
Even though for the purposes of this experiment this message was discarded, it may be interest-
ing to consider in future works.
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3.2 summary.sh
After the raw data text files are extracted they need to be processed in order for the results to
be compared efficiently. Firstly, a script called clean.sh needs to be invoked to remove any
incomplete results and to change the formatting using the tool dos2unix, then the actual parsing
can be done. The main script summary.sh is responsible for creating a .csv file for each app
tested. The four different categories of system features have their own script for parsing the
correspondent .txt file so in total these are the following scripts:
• summary-cpu.sh
• summary-mem.sh
• statistics-calls.sh
• statistics-network.sh
The four scripts function similarly in the way that all of them produce a single .csv file using
a pearl script to parse the .txt that looks for the features that need to be extracted. The only
difference between the scripts is that the ones for calls and network have to adjust the records
produced by tcpstat and strace respectively to the time stamps saved by behave_lugano.sh.
However, due to the fact that a more recent version of the emulator had to be used, a newer
version of the scripts had to be used as well. The structure and functionality of the scripts are
the same as the described above, however, some modifications had to be made like changing the
name of the features extracted.
3.3 Sequence of events
The first step of this study was to install and setup the tool DroidBot in the server. The tool had
to be installed with pip, but the existing version in the server was incompatible. Due to the lack
of privileges in the server, a newer version of python itself and some python related tools like pip
or setuptools were installed with a tool called spack. Briefly, this utility is a package manager
that installs packages with every dependency, meaning that the lack of privileges presented no
further problems since the designated user had permission over every other package.
Having two versions of python caused some troubles which were solved using another python
tool called virtualenv. It creates a virtual environment with a fresh copy of python and some of
its packages. It turned out to be a rather useful tool during the installation phase because differ-
ent versions of DroidBot were tested and virtualenv allowed them to coexist without any issues.
After the environment is setup and tested properly, the apps need to be exercised. The two ver-
sions of the script behave_lugano.sh described in the previous section were executed for every
app in the dataset producing two different sets of results, one for Monkey and the other for Droid-
Bot.
The raw data obtained was processed with the extraction scripts described in the previous section
and the only work left was to compare the results.
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4 Evaluation
The features extracted from the raw data logs contain information about the CPU usage, Memory,
System calls and Network data. A smaller subset from the previous experiment was chosen for
the reason aforementioned that different scripts were used for the data extraction. The following
table details every feature that was extracted [4].
Category Feature names
CPU
CPU Usage Total CPU Usage, User CPU Usage, Kernel CPU Usage
Virtual Memory Page minor faults
Memory
Native Memory Native Pss, Native Private Dirty, Native Private Clean, Native
Swapped Dirty, Native Heap Size, Native Heap Alloc,Native
Heap Free
Dalvik Memory Dalvik Pss, Dalvik Private Dirty,Dalvik Private Clean, Dalvik
Swapped Dirty, Dalvik Heap Size, Dalvik Heap Alloc, Dalvik
Heap Free, Dalvik Other Pss, Dalvik Other Private Dirty, Dalvik
Other Private Clean, Dalvik Other Swapped Dirty
Stack Stack Pss, Stack Private Dirty, Stack Private Clean, Stack
Swapped Dirty
Android Shared
Memory
Ashem Pss, Ashem Private Dirty, Ashem Private Clean, Ashem
Swapped Dirty
Other memory
and mapped files
Other dev Pss, Other dev Private Dirty, Other dev Private
Clean, Other dev Swapped Dirty, .so mmap Pss, .so mmap Pri-
vate Dirty, .so mmap Private Clean, .so mmap Swapped Dirty,
.apk mmap Pss, .apk mmap Private Dirty, .apk mmap Private
Clean, .apk mmap Swapped Dirty,.dexmmap Pss, .dexmmap
Private Dirty, .dexmmap Private Clean, .dexmmap Swapped
Dirty, Other mmap Pss, Other mmap Private Dirty, Other
mmap Private Clean Other mmap Swapped Dirty
Memmory
mapped fonts
.ttfmmap Pss, .ttfmmap Private Dirty, .ttfmmap Private Clean,
.ttfmmap Swapped Dirty
Non-classified
memory alloca-
tions
Unknown Pss, Unknown Private Dirty, Unknown Private
Clean, Unknown Swapped Dirty
Memory Totals TOTAL Pss, TOTAL Private Dirty, TOTAL Private Clean, TOTAL
Swapped Dirty, TOTAL Heap Size, TOTAL Heap Alloc, TOTAL
Heap Free
Statistics on System calls Number of Syscalls, No. of different syscalls, Average no. of
calls per syscall, No. of calls occuring once, No. of calls occur-
ring multiple times
Network
Link layer net-
working
Number of ARP packets, AVG. PKT Size bytes, bps, Number of
ICMP packets, Size in byte standard deviation
Internet layer
networking
Number of IPv4 packets, Network load over last minute, Maxi-
mum packet size in bytes, Minimum packet size in bytes, Num-
ber of bytes, Number of packets, Number of packets per sec-
ond, Number of IPv6 packets
Transport layer
networking
Number of TCP packets, Number of UDP packets
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4.1 Comparison
This experiment consists of two time series with a 2 second observation period, one for Mon-
keyRunner and the other one for DroidBot. The average and standard deviation is computed for
every feature, and then both the DroidBot average and standard deviation is compared with the
Monkey average and standard deviation using the difference percentage. The formula used is:
%di f f erence =
(Monke yval − DroidBotval)
DroidBotval
· 100
If the result is positive it means that the value of Monkey is higher than DroidBot, if it is nega-
tive it means the contrary. This formula was chosen because the percentage is more representative
of the data but it is worth noting that it presents a fault when one of the values is 0. In the case
where the DroidBot average equals 0 the precentage would go to∞.
4.2 Results
The following section includes the results obtained after comparing the execution traces from
both experiments. Not every feature is displayed or discussed as in some of the features no sig-
nificant change could be noted. However, for the rest of them, the data is analyzed with the help
of plots and a possible explanation for their results is given.
On the title of each graph appears the name of the feature plotted. The X axis in the plots
represent the apps tested and in the labels the first characters of the hash of the real name of
the app is displayed. The Y axis represents in percentage, the difference in percentage in both
mean and standard deviation. There is a possibility for negative values to appear for the reason
mentioned before: a negative value means that the DroidBot value for that feature is larger than
the MonkeyRunner.
4.2.1 CPU
As it is highlighted in the graphs, the differences in the CPU are notable. The explanation for this
result could be the difference in how both of the tools work. As mentioned before, MonkeyRunner
randomly sends events with a very high frequency, while in DroidBot the time between events is
higher, which results in an increased CPU usage for the former tool.
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For every feature it can be observed that Monkey has a significantly higher CPU usage with
values reaching a 1000% growth. However, for the minor faults feature it appears to be the
opposite. A possible explanation for this result could be that while using DroidBot, the more
time between events allows for other processes to overwrite the cache and when the app that is
undergoing the test executes the next instruction it produces a cache miss. In order to understand
better this last feature, for both tools, a graph representing the minor faults over time for the app
"bbc32" are depicted.
Now, the significant difference in the standard deviation can be appreciated. Multiple spikes
in minor faults appear in the DroidBot graph, this could happen due to the reason mentioned
multiple times that the time between events for the tool DroidBot is higher so the application
under test have some idle periods.
4.2.2 Memory
In the vast majority of the memory features the values were negative and did not surpass the
-10% mark. This means that consistently DroidBot produces higher values for memory features.
The largest values were observed in the "Total Private Dirty" and "Total Private Clean" features
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reaching the -100% mark. Only the "Total Private Dirty" plot is featured because the latter one
had a value high enough to make the rest of the plot unreadable.
This graph is further explored for the app named "f695", same as before, for both tools, the
feature is plotted over time.
4.2.3 System Calls
Most of the features involving system calls represent a total number of system calls during the
execution. Since the execution time of an app under DroidBot is considerably lower than the time
under MonkeyRunner, the total number of system calls is inevitably going to be lower as well. For
this reason most of the features are not plotted since the results are predictable. Graphs of two
of the features that were most different are shown.
It can be highlighted that in the left plot one app shows a spike in the mean difference. As
it is the only app with this behaviour it will be considered not representative.
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4.2.4 Network
Network results in a way are very similar to the CPU ones. The higher activity during run-time
with MonkeyRunner makes a notable difference in network features such as the number of packets
sent or the number of bytes sent. This only corroborates that DroidBot is significantly less resource
oriented. Two features are displayed:
The results from the plots are expected. Even though for two apps DroidBot produced more
network traffic, it can be stated that MonkeyRunner is the one with the higher value in network
statistics. The difference in the standard deviation is complemented with graphs of the number
of packets per second for the app named "ba17" for both tools.
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The feature of the average packet size displayed in the graph shows an interesting result:
it would be normal to think that the average packet size should be similar from both tools but
this data depicts the opposite result and with considerably high numbers. A possible explanation
could be that at the same time MonkeyRunner produces a higher traffic it simultaneously keeps
the connections open for longer. Which could mean that the smaller protocol header packets have
more presence in the average, however this is just a hypothesis and further investigation should
be pursued.
5 Conclusion
Malware triggering/detection is an important aspect of application safety as it improves security.
Even though dynamic methods of malware detection can be tedious and time consuming they
also can make a difference while testing apps. It was previously tested that the MonkeyRunner
method was efficient for ransomware detection and with this experiment the question of "Will
DroidBot produce different results?" was raised.
A dataset of malicious applications was tested under both tools MonkeyRunner and DroidBot.
The raw data collected by the bash scripts while the tools were working was processed into in-
terpretable .csv files. With these files, the features that showed more change were plotted and
interpreted. However, working with DroidBot was at times unreliable. This could be due to the
combination of using an older version of DroidBot and the applications under test. The tool is
also more sophisticated than Monkeyrunner which could have effected its reliability.
The results obtained ensured that there is a difference in some parameters such as CPU or
Network while in others it was more limited. A statement which determined that DroidBot is a
better tool than Monkey for malware detection cannot be made; a more in depth analysis using
classifiers should take place in order to find out which one produces better results.
Moreover, this study can act as a primary reference for future experiments to be conducted in
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determining whether DroidBot is a more useful tool for malware detection.
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